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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24( a)( 1), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, the following sets
forth a complete list of all parties to the trial court proceeding:
Appellants
Andrew L. Ellsworth (Plaintiff)
Mark L. Ellsworth (Plaintiff, Respondent and Intervenor Defendant)
Michelle Thomas (Plaintiff)
Ken L. Ellsworth (Plaintiff)
Tami Jasper (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Tim Ellsworth (Plaintiff)
The Ellsworth Family Trust dated May 1, 1991 (Plaintiff, Petitioner and Defendant)
Appellees
Terry Huffstatler (Defendant., Petitioner, Intervenor Plaintiff)
Jim Huffstatler (Defendant)
Karl V. Baker (Defendant)
Keith A. Baker (Defendant)
.
The Ellsworth Family Trust dated May 1., 1991 (Plaintiff, Petitioner and Defendant)
The Estate of Barbara Mae Ellsworth (Defendant)
Barbara May Ellsworth (now deceased) (Defendant and Petitioner)
Barbara May Ellsworth Trust date March 19, 2013 (Intervenor Plaintiff)
In accordance with Rule 24(d) Terry Huffstatler will be referred to as ··Terry'-'; Mark
Ellsworth will be referred to as .:'Mark"; Michelle Thomas will be referred to as ""Michelle";
The Ellsworth Family Trust., dated May 1, 1991 will be referred to as the ·'1991 Trust" or
··EFT'~~ The Barbara May Ellsworth Trust, dated March 19, 2013 will be referred to as the
"'2013 Trust''; Barbara May Ellsworth will be referred to as "'Barbara''; Elmer ··Bud"
Ellsworth will be referred to as "Elmer"; attorney Steve Skabelund (who represented Elmer
and Barbara in connection with their estate planning) will be referred to as ·'Mr.
Skabelund."
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ARGUMENT

On appeal, Appellants have argued that the trial court erred when it determined
Barbara became the owner of the precious metals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-102.
To meet the conditions of§ 75-3-102, it must be shown that,'~ ... the devisee ... possessed
the property devised in accordance with the provisions of the will. -- The trial court ruled
that the Elmer's will C-'Will"') unambiguously named Barbara as the devisee who should
receive the precious metals. Appellants contend there is ambiguity in the provisions of the
Will which make it puzzling to determine whether Barbara or the 1991 Trust was the
devisee of the will. Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law.
Additionally, Appellants have argued that the trial court erred when it determined
Appellees rebutted the legal presumption that Barbara's creation of the 2013 Trust was
unfair. The record in this case establishes that Barbara created the 2013 Trust because of
information she obtained from her daughter Terry relating to a March 13 ~ 2013 email, and
the trial court determined that Terry had overreacted to that email.
The Brief of Appellees makes several arguments opposing Appellant's position.
Appellants respond to Appellees' specific arguments below 1:
I.

Appellees assert. ··£/mer Ellsworth's Will is not ambiguous and does not support
the alternate interpretation that Appellants seek to apply. "
This Court can review the Will and reach its own legal conclusions regarding it

without deference to the trial court. Appellants contend the trial court could not determine

For convenience, Appellants have adopted the outline format contained in Appellecs'
Brief and have restated the specific headings used by Appellees.
1

1

the devisee from a simple reading of the Will because of the existence of ambiguity.
Appellants have offered a reasonable interpretation of the Will which differs from the
conclusion reached by the trial court. Where the Will does not clearly name a devisee, the
trial court erred in concluding Barbara was the Will's devisee. As a result, the trial court
erred in applying§ 75-3-102 and determining Barbara was the proper owner of the precious
metals.
A.

Appellees assert, ''The terms ofElmer's Will and EFT are not ambiguous. "

As a threshold issue, Appellants have not alleged on appeal that the 1991 Trust is
ambiguous. The trial court appears to have relied on the terms of the Will in reaching its
decision regarding the application of § 75-3-102. It is the Will Appellants claim is
ambiguous. The language of the 1991 Trust is not at issue on appeal.
In their brief, Appellees seek to have this Court focus on the statement, ~'If my
spouse survives me, I give to her all items of Personal Property.'~ Significantly, the
parenthetical -'as hereinafter defined" is largely ignored. This statement, when standing
alone without the parenthetical, does not seem to be complete. A complete statement would
be something similar to, •'Ifmy spouse survives me, I give to her all ofmy items of Personal
Property." Another possible complete statement might be, '"If my spouse survives me, I
give to her all items of Personal Property that are contained in my safe.~, The standalone
statement which Appellees emphasize, however, does not clearly indicate what personal
property is being devised because the sentence is not complete without the parenthetical.
The trial court reached its conclusions by making an assumption about what Elmer
intended. In its summary judgment ruling, the trial court stated:
2
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Even though Elmer does not define the words "Personal Property,
is susceptible to construing it by its plain meaning. As a result,
assumed that Elmer's intent concerning the distribution of his
property is the same as the conclusion a plain meaning of
communicates.

the term
it can be
personal
the Will

(R. I 069-1070) (Emphasis added.)
If the trial court is --assuming·~ what Elmer~ s intent was, then by definition the trial
court could not have been relying on the plain meaning of the Will when reaching its
conclusions. Simply stated, if the trial court could have determined Elmer's intent from the
plain meaning of the Will. an assumption would not be required.
As has been stated before, the Paragraph Fourth of the Will expressly states (in
relevant part):
If my spouse survives me, I give to her all items of Personal Property
(as hereinafter defined). If my spouse does not survive me, I give those items
of Personal Property (but not money, notes, documents of title, stock
certificates or business property) to the individuals named in my
Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property.
(Trial Exhibit 1 at page l 0)
The trial court construed this provision as follows, ·'A plain reading of the
Will explains that Barbara is to receive Elmer's personal property which was not
transf~rred to someone else or to the family trust." (R. 1070) Essentially, the trial
court is stating that because the precious metals were not transferred to the 1991
Trust, and because the Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property was not
completed, Barbara gets everything by default.
Appellees interpret Paragraph Fourth of the Will as follows:

3

Elmer's Will clearly states: "'[i]f my spouse survives me, I give to her
all items of Personal Property." This statement is unequivocal-upon Elmer
Ellsworth's death., Barbara Ellsworth was to receive all of Elmer Ellsworth's
personal property. The only exception to this requirement is if the personal
property were listed on a Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property
and that Memorandum included Elmer's signature and the identity of the
intended recipient of the specified personal property. No such Memorandum
exists.
(Brief of Appellees at pages 11-12)
Under these interpretations of the Will, the personal property either goes to Barbara
or to the intended recipient named in the Memorandum. There is no other possible
distribution of the personal property under these readings. These interpretations are
problematic, however, when viewed against that plain language of Paragraph Fifth of the
Will. Paragraph Fifth provides in relevant part:
"My residuary estate" means all my interest in real and personal
property, whether community or separate and wherever situated, which I may
own at my death (excluding property over which I may have a power of
appointment) and which I have not disposed of by the preceding provisions
of this will.
I give my residuary estate to the Trustee then actin under that certain
Trust Agreement named The ELLSWORTH FAMILY TRUST created on
the 1st day of May, 1991, to be aggregated with (and held, administered, and
distributed as an integral part of said Trust Estate in the manner and subject
to the terms and provisions provided for in the Trust Agreement, including
any amendments thereto made during my lifetime .... "
Paragraph Fifth clearly contemplates the existence of a possible residuary estate of
personal property that could be transferred to the 1991 Trust after application of Paragraph
Fourth. This directly contradicts the Appellees and the trial court's interpretation of the
Will that all personal property either goes to Barbara or some person named on the
Memorandum of Disposition. The very existence of Paragraph Fifth is evidence that Elmer
4

intended the personal property could pass to the 1991 Trust. In fact, Paragraph Fifth would
have no meaning under the trial court and Appellees' interpretation of the Will.
Under Appellants· interpretation of the Will, all of these provisions make sense and
fit together. Appellants contend the Will should be read as follows: (I) If Barbara survives
Elmer, then Elmer devises to Barbara all items of "Personal Property" which are
specifically defined by Elmer: (2) Since no items of "Personal Property" were ever defined
by Elmer, he must have intended that no specific items of "Personal Property" would pass
directly to Barbara; and (3) Since no items of Personal Property passed directly to Barbara,
the non-defined personal property would pass to the 1991 Trust pursuant to Paragraph
Fifth2 of the Will.
At bottom, there is an ambiguity as to whether Elmer intended to devise all, some
or none of his personal property to Barbara via his Will. Where there is a question as to
the proper devisee, the application of§ 75-3-102 by the trial court was error.
1.

Appellees assert, "The term Personal Property is easily defined."

Appellees make the general statement that the term "personal property" is easily
defined.

Appellants do not necessarily disagree with this statement if the common

definition of the term is intended to be used. The fact remains, however, if Elmer intended
to use the common definition of "personal property" there would be no need to define that
tenn in the Will. The only reason to include a definition of "'Personal Property" would be
to provide a definition which was different from the common definition.

:!

As it turned out, Barbara survived Elmer. Had Barbara not survived Elmer, and because

Elmer did not complete the Memorandum of Distribution of Personal Property. all Personal

Property would have transferred to the 1991 Trust pursuant to Paragraph Fifth.
5

Appellees fail to explain why the parenthetical "'as hereinafter defined'~ is present if
there was some meaning to be ascribed to it. The trial court found, '·Elmer's will leaves the
reader anticipating a list of personal property that will specifically be transfer [sic] to
Barbara upon Elmer's death." (R. I 069-1070) Thus, even the trial court was questioning
what Elmer intended to transfer to Barbara.
In this case, the common meaning of "personal property" cannot properly be used to
construe the Will. Given the --as hereinafter defined'' language which is expressly contained
in the Will, it can reasonably be interpreted that '"Personal Property" as used in the Will
has a different meaning than its common definition because the Will indicates that the term
will be defined in the document. In fact, it is at least as reasonable to assume Elmer
intended a limited definition of "Personal Property'' as it is to assume that he intended the
common definition. The term "personal property" as that term is used in the Will cannot
easily be defined because it is not clear what Elmer intended. As was stated in Appellant's
opening brief, "A contract is "ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms. or other facial
deficiencies."' Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 25; 190 P.3d 1269 (Utah 2008). It is
uncertain what meaning Elmer attributed to the term "Personal Property" because the
anticipated definition is not included in the document. Consequently, an ambiguity exists.
11.

Appellees assert, ''Appellants' proffered definition is untenable in the context
ofthe provisions ofthe Will and EFT

Appellees argue, ··Appellants would have this Court endow a parenthetical with a
meaning that it was never intended to have .... " (Brief of Appellees at page 16) Of course.
6

m making this statement Appellees are resulting to speculation regarding what the
parenthetical was intended to mean. The real question is, ··Can the Will reasonably be
interpreted to have more than one meaning?" While it is possible some sort of scrivener~s
error (a term used by Appellees) occurred, the fact remains that the lack of a definition for
the term ·'Personal Propertf ~ creates an ambiguity in the context of this case. Appellants
have already provided a reasonable interpretation which differs from the conclusions
reached by the trial court. Appellants interpretation is just as reasonable as the conclusion
reached by the trial court because the ambiguity exists.
B.

Appellees assert, "Had EFT owned the precious metals. Barbara's gift o(the
iunk silver would have violated EFT's terms; Appellants' acceptance of the
iunk silver confirms that the precious metals were never part of the EFT's
trust estate.

Here, Appellees argue that Appellants acceptance of •junk silver" many years after
Elmer died is somehow relevant to whether the language in the Will is ambiguous.
Interestingly, this section of Appellees' Brief is attempting to use parol evidence to support
Appellees' interpretation of the Will.
Because the trial court ruled the Will was unambiguous, there was no parol evidence
which was received by the trial court regarding interpretation of the Will. While there are
valid reasons why Appellants accepted the junk silver from Barbara which have nothing to
do with Appellants' understanding regarding who owned the junk silver. those reasons
were never presented to the trial court because it ruled the precious metals belonged to
Barbara. Litigation regarding the precious metals stopped when the trial court issued its

7

summary judgment ruling. In fact, in its ruling on the summary judgment motion the trial
court stated:
The alleged facts indicate that, at .some point before litigation, the
precious metals may have been treated as if they had been transferred to the
EFT. However, as stated before, transfer of property into a trust must be
done in a specific way none of which include solely treating property as if it
is part of a trust.
(R. 1069 at footnote 5)
Appellees are essentially alleging facts regarding Appellants' understanding of the
ownership of the precious metals which are not part of the record. Appellants acceptance
of junk silver in 2013 does not by default establish a concession by Appellants that Barbara
owned those precious metals or that the Will is unambiguous. Appellants were not able to
present parol evidence because of the trial court's ruling on summary judgment.
By resorting to arguing parol evidence, however, Appellees themselves have
established that parol evidence is needed to determine Elmer's intent because a simple
reading of the Will does not provide enough information. Appellants believe they should
be entitled to present parol evidence in the same manner Appellees have. That is one reason
this appeal has been filed.
C.

Appellees assert. "The trial court correctly applied the statutory language of
UC.A. § 75-3-102 and utilized Elmer's Will as evidence that Barbara was
the rightful owner of the precious metals after Elmer's death.

Appellees argue that the trial court's application of § 75-3-102 was proper.
Appellees position can only be supported if there is no ambiguity in the proper devisee of
Elmer's Will.

As has been established above, there is ambiguity in the Will which

precludes proper allocation of the statutory provision.
8

Appellees also argue that Appellants never introduced any admissible evidence for
the trial court to consider. Obviously, since the trial court ruled the Will was unambiguous
there was not an opportunity for Appellants to present parol evidence to the trial court.

If this Court determines there is ambiguity in Elmer's Will regarding the devisee of
that Will, then application of§ 75-3-102 was improper. There first must be a finding and
conclusion regarding the actual devisee of the Will based on appropriate evidence. A
proper finding has not yet been made because the trial court has not heard the evidence
necessary to make that finding.

IL

Appellees assert. "The evidence presented at trial overcame the presumption of
undue influence. ··
At trial, Appellants asserted a claim that Barbara was unduly influenced to create

the 2013 Trust. In Utah, undue influence is presumed when a '·confidential relationship"
exists between the trust or will creator and the beneficiary of the will or trust. Estate of

loupe v. Carter, 878 P.2d 1168 (Utah App. 1994). The trial court expressly found a
confidential relationship existed between Barbara and Terry. (R. 1659) When a confidential
relationship exists, a presumption of unfairness arises which must be overcome by
countervailing evidence. and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove absence of
unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbell. 674 P.2d 1226
(Utah 1983 ). Also, when a confidential relationship exists, and a transaction occurs that
benefits the one in whom the confidence is placed, a presumption arises that the transaction
is unfair. See, e.g. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah.2d 3 78, 3 83,401 P .2d 710, 713 ( 1965).
The finding of a confidential relationship shifts to the benefitting party the burden to
9

persuade the court that there was no fraud or undue influence exercised toward the other.

In re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah.2d 277,293,293 P.2d 682, 693 (1956).
The trial court indicated that Barbara's decision to create the 2013 Trust resulted
from an email Mark sent to Terry on March 13, 2013. (R. 1678 at, 17) The trial judge
determined that Terry considered the email to contain a ··threat'' and ··demand'" that Barbara
resign as Trustee. (R. 1677 at

1

18) Further, the trial court expressly found that Terry

overreacted to that email. (R. 1651) Additionally, Mark's email was never shown to
Barbara. (R. 1912 at page 49) Rather, Terry explained its contents to Barbara. Id.
The evidence at trial established that Barbara was relying on what Terry told her,
and not the March 13, 2013 email itself. Thus, to rebut the presumption of unfairness, there
must be some evidential showing that Barbara was not acting on Terry's overreaction to
the email. Because that evidence does not exist in the record, the only conclusion that can
be reached is Barbara was acting on Terry's overreaction. Accordingly, the estate planning
changes were fundamentally unfair because Barbara was unduly influenced by Terry's
overreaction.
A.

Appellees assert., ''Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence. "

Appellees allege Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence which supports the
trial court's factual findings. Appellant's position, however, is that the legal presumption
of unfairness was not rebutted because Appellees failed to show that Barbara's actions and
motivations in creating the 2013 Trust were based on accurate information provided from
Terry. Under the facts presented at trial, Barbara may have had reasons to create the 2013
Trust, but based on the evidence presented at trial, those reasons were triggered by the
10

March 13, 2013 email and Terry's overreaction to it. The facts establish this email was
never shown to Barbara and Terry overreacted to that email. Appellants have marshaled
these facts. The events with Barbara that transpired subsequent to this time were, based on
the evidence in the record, tainted by Terry's overreaction.
Appellees state that Appellants failed to marshal evidence supporting the trial courts
finding that undue influence did not occur. Specifically, Appellees state:
The trial court ultimately found that the evidence presented at trial
--preponderates against a finding of unfairness'" and that the Barbara May
Ellsworth Trust was ~'not the result of undue influence." (R. at 1657.) To
support these ultimate findings, the trial court, among many other things,
found that the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust was prepared with the assistance
of counsel, that the new estate plan reflected Barbara's own wishes, and that
Barbara had her own motivations to seek to create a new estate plan.
Furthermore., the trial court found that Barbara understood ··that she owned
the [marital home] and that she wanted to sell that residence to a particular
family,'~ that she knew ··what her property [was] and" was able to ··formulate
a plan for its disposition." (R. at 1661.) The trial court specifically referenced
both Mr. Skabelund' s belief that Barbara did not lack testamentary capacity
and Dr. Curzon~s medical determination that Barbara "was able to generally
understand what was going on and make decisions concerning her assets."
(R. at 1660-61.)
Notably, Appellants are not contesting these findings on appeal. Rather, Appellants
contend each of these facts came into existence because Barbara was unduly influenced by
Terry's overreaction to the March 13, 2013 email. Pursuantto Utah law, once the trial court
determined a confidential relationship existed, the burden then shifted to Appellees to
prove absence of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court found Terry
overreacted to the emai 1. It is undisputed that Terry did not show the email to Barbara.
Given these facts, to meet their burden to prove absence of unfairness, Appellees
must point to evidence in the record showing that Barbara was not acting on Terry's
11

overreaction to the email. Because that evidence does not exist in the record, the only
conclusion that can be reached is Barbara was acting on Terry's overreaction. Accordingly,
the estate planning changes were fundamentally unfair because Barbara was unduly
influenced by Terry's overreaction.
B.

Appellees assert, .. There is no burden upon Appellees to prove any other
facts related to Barbara's understanding of Mark Ellsworth's March 13,
2013 email.

Appellees contend they had no burden to establish Barbara's understanding of the
March 13, 2013 email. Appellees' burden at trial is clearly established by Utah law. The
trial court found a confidential relationship existed between Barbara and Terry. Where a
confidential relationship exists, a presumption of unfairness arises which must be
overcome by countervailing evidence, and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
absence of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbell, 674
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). Moreover, when a confidential relationship exists. and a
transaction occurs that benefits the one in whom the confidence is placed, a presumption
arises that the transaction is unfair. See, e.g. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah.2d 378, 383,
40 I P.2d 710, 713 (1965). This shifts to the benefitting party the burden to persuade the
court that there was no fraud or undue influence exercised toward the other. In re Swan's

Estate, 4 Utah.2d 277,293,293 P.2d 682,693 (1956).

It is uncontested that Barbara's creation of the 2013 Trust benefitted Terry. As a
confidential relationship existed between Barbara and Terry a presumption arises that the
transaction (creation of the 2013 Trust) was unfair. It then became Appellees' burden to
establish the transaction was fair.
12

As is stated above, the trial court found that Terry overreacted to this email.
Barbara's subsequent actions were based on what Terry told Barbara about this email
(because Terry testified she did not show it to Barbara). It was Appellees burden to show
the creation of the 2013 Trust was fair. Where the evidence in the record shows that
Barbara only had information from Terry regarding the March 13, 2013 email. and where
Terry overreacted, Appellees have a duty to show Barbara was acting independently of
Terry to establish creation of the 2013 Trust was fair. 3 There is no such evidence in the
record. 4

CONCLUSION
Appellants request that this Court reverse the trial court's summary judgment
determination that the Precious Metals were properly Barbara's pursuant to § 75-3-102.
There is ambiguity as to who is the property devisee under the terms of the Will. Because
of that lack of clarity. it cannot properly be concluded that Barbara was the devisee of the
Precious Metals. If Barbara was not devisee of the Precious Metals. then the Court
improperly relied on § 75-2-102 in concluding that Barbara was the owner of the Precious
Metals.

:- Appellees argue that Appellants assume Barbara could not think for herself. There is no
evidence in the record, however, that Barbara did anything but rely on information she
received from Terry regarding the March 13, 2013 email.
.i Appellees reference testimony of Mr. Skabelund arguing that he thought the March 13.
2013 email was a threat. (Brief of Appellees at page 22.) It appears that in this testimony
Mr. Skabelund was referring to emails that were sent subsequent to March 13, 2013 by
Michelle Thomas. The trial court referred to these emails in its Findings and Conclusions.
(R. 1673

at

1 34) Mr. Skabelund's testimony also makes clear that he thought Barbara

··always liked Mark,·· (R. 1912 at page 186 line 23)
13

Additionally, the trial court erred when it determined Appellees rebutted the
presumption of unfairness of Barbara creating the 2013 Trust. While the evidence at trial
established Barbara created the 2013 Trust because she was angry at one or more of the
Ellsworth children, the evidence and findings of the trial court also establishes that Barbara
was only acting on information she received from Terry. The trial court found Terry had
overreacted.

Where Barbara did not see the actual email, but only received Terry's

understanding that it contained a "threat" and a "demand," the record can only support a
finding that Barbara acted on Terry's overreaction and not on independent review of the
email itself. Consequently, Appellees did not meet their burden to show fairness.
Appellants respectfully respect that the Court reverse the summary judgment
decision and remand this matter for further proceeding to determine Elmer's intent
regarding the beneficiary of his Will. Additionally, Appellants request that this Court
reverse the trial court's determination that Appellees appropriately rebutted the
presumption of unfairness and direct the trial court to enter a finding that the presumption
of undue influence was not rebutted by the Appellees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of January" 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(00)
1.

This reply brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P.

24(f) (1) because this brief contains no more than 4,067 words, excluding the parts of the
brief exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(l )(B ).
2.

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b)

because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft
Word 2013 in font size 13 and Times New Roman type font.
DATED this 4th day of January, 2016.
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I hereby certify that a copy of foregoing Brief Of Appellant was served upon the

following individuals~ by email and by first class mail, postage prepaid., at the addresses
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